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Rigertas: The Supreme Court and Recusals: A Response to Professor Lubet

THE SUPREME COURT AND RECUSALS:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LUBET
Laurel A. Rigertas*
I would like to thank Valparaiso University Law School for the
opportunity to participate in its scholarly roundtable discussion
following Steven Lubet’s lecture at the annual Tabor Institute on Legal
Ethics lecture series. This essay is in response to Professor Lubet’s
lecture and his corresponding article, Stonewalling, Leaks and CounterLeaks: SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, which addresses
the Supreme Court’s failure to adopt a code of conduct.1 While this is a
broad topic that covers many areas, such as confidentiality, public
speaking, and the acceptance of gifts, this essay focuses on the area that
Lubet addressed—recusals. Lubet argues that the Supreme Court
should adopt a comprehensive code of conduct that would, among other
areas, address recusals. In particular, Lubet argues that the full Supreme
Court should review an individual Justice’s decision regarding recusal.
I agree with two main points that Lubet makes in his article. First,
the Supreme Court’s rationale for not adopting a code of conduct—as
recently set out by Chief Justice Roberts—is unpersuasive.2 Second, the
current recusal practice—where each Justice decides on his or her own
behalf whether recusal is warranted without explanation or review—
makes it difficult for the public to understand recusal decisions and to
know what to expect from the Justices in future cases.3 In short, the
current practice lacks standards, transparency, and accountability.4
Lubet’s proposal that the full Supreme Court review recusal decisions
would address some of these issues, but it raises some concerns about
the public’s perception of the institution, which this essay explores
briefly.
As Lubet points out, the Supreme Court is the only court in the
United States that has not adopted a code of conduct.5 In the past couple
of years this aberration has received some public scrutiny, which
Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks: SCOTUS Ethics in
the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883 (2013).
2
Id. at 888.
3
Id. at 890–91.
4
See James J. Alfini, Supreme Court Ethics: The Need for Greater Transparency and
Accountability, 21 PROF. LAW. 10, 10–13 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s need for
greater transparency and accountability, particularly in the area of recusals); Sherrilyn A.
Ifill, Judicial Recusal at the Court, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 331, 336 (2012) (noting how
the Supreme Court’s lack of transparency makes it difficult for litigants and the public to
understand the Court’s decisions).
5
Lubet, supra note 1, at 886–87.
*
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resulted in academics and members of Congress making some efforts,
albeit unsuccessful ones, to correct this deficiency.6 No action was ever
taken on the Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011
(HR 682), which proposed reforms. Chief Justice Roberts addressed
these efforts in his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary.7 In that
report, Roberts set forth his justifications for the Supreme Court’s
decision not to adopt the Code of Judicial Conduct that has been adopted
by the Judicial Conference of the United States and applies to every other
federal judge in the United States.8 Roberts reasoned, in short, that there
were other sources that could guide the Justices, that a code could not
answer all ethical questions (particularly those unique to the Supreme
Court), and that “no compilation of ethical rules can guarantee
integrity.”9
Lubet’s article persuasively explains why each of those observations,
while accurate enough, does not justify the Supreme Court’s choice to
operate without a code of conduct.10 Are there other reasons unstated by
Roberts that explain the Court’s resistance to enacting a code of conduct?
Perhaps the real reason for the reluctance to adopt a code of conduct is
that it would lead logically to the question of how it would be enforced,
a question that the Justices do not want to answer.11 The Supreme Court
has a long tradition of preserving not only its independence as an
institution, but the independence of each Justice’s decisions.12 Adopting

Id. at 887. Over 100 law professors wrote to Congress asking it to enact legislation that
would require the Supreme Court to follow the Judicial Conference’s Code of Conduct,
which applies to all other federal judges. Id. Following this letter, the Supreme Court
Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011 (HR 862) was introduced, which would have
required the Supreme Court to follow the Judicial Conference’s Code of Conduct. Id.
Neither of these efforts yielded any results. Id.
7
Lubet, supra note 1, at 887–88; see also CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf.
8
ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 3–5.
9
Id. at 4–5, 11.
10
Lubet, supra note 1, at 888–91.
11
A letter from over 100 law professors to congressional committees urged the adoption
of a code of conduct for the Supreme Court and further urged the establishment of “a set of
procedures to enforce the Code’s standards as applied to Supreme Court justices.” Letter
from 138 Law Professors to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms. 1, 3 (Mar. 17, 2011),
available at http://www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf. (emphasis added). As
Lubet writes, the Justices “appear to regard with near horror” the idea that they have been
held accountable for noncompliance with standards. Lubet, supra note 1, at 890.
12
See Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, An Independent Judiciary:
In Honor of the Sesquicentennial Anniversary of the Massachusetts Superior Court (Sept. 22,
2009), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename
=sp_09-22-09.html.
In a 2009 speech that Justice Breyer gave regarding judicial
6

http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss4/4

Rigertas: The Supreme Court and Recusals: A Response to Professor Lubet

2013]

The Supreme Court and Recusals

941

a process to review an individual Justice’s recusal decision would be
antithetical to this tradition. That concern may be the real reason the
Supreme Court has not enacted a code of conduct.
Roberts’s Year-End Report provides some support for this theory.
The Report correctly notes that the Code of Conduct, as adopted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, applies only to lower federal
court judges:
That reflects a fundamental difference between the
Supreme Court and the other federal courts. Article III
of the Constitution creates only one court, the Supreme
Court of the United States, but it empowers Congress to
establish additional lower federal courts that the
Framers knew the country would need. Congress
instituted the Judicial Conference for the benefit of the
courts it had created. Because the Judicial Conference is
an instrument for the management of the lower federal
courts, its committees have no mandate to prescribe
rules or standards for any other body.13
Roberts then goes on to assert that the Members of the Court do refer to
the Judicial Conference’s Code of Conduct. They are guided by it,
however, in the same spirit as the first code of conduct that was drafted
for judges—the 1924 Canons of Judicial Conduct.14 As Roberts points out,
“The 1924 Canons were advisory.”15 In other words, they were not
enforceable standards. If the Justices are only guided by advisory
sources and not bound by a definitive code, then the problems of
accountability and enforcement do not need to be addressed.
The enforcement problem is a particularly troublesome one for the
Supreme Court in the area of recusals. As Roberts points out, “There is
no higher court to review a Justice’s decision not to recuse in a particular
case . . . . [T]he Supreme Court does not sit in judgment of one of its own
Members’ decision whether to recuse in the course of deciding a case.”16
So if a code of conduct was adopted and addressed recusals, who would
review a Justice’s decision regarding recusal?

independence, he used the concepts of the independence of the judiciary and the
independence of judges interchangeably. Id.
13
ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 3–4.
14
Id. at 4.
15
Id. at 2. Later Roberts states that “the Code remains the starting point and key source
of guidance for the Justices as well as their lower court colleagues.” Id. at 5.
16
Id. at 8–9.
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Under current practice, a motion for recusal is referred to the Justice
to whom the motion is directed. That Justice then makes his or her own
decision about whether recusal is warranted.17 When making this
decision, the Justices are guided by Title 28, Section 455 of the United
States Code, which states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”18 The Justices rarely
explain their reasons for granting or denying a motion for recusal.19 The
Justices’ decisions are not reviewed and, therefore, can never be
reversed.20 As Roberts’s Report concludes, “I have complete confidence
in the capability of my colleagues to determine when recusal is
warranted. . . . We are all deeply committed to the common interest in
preserving the Court’s vital role as an impartial tribunal governed by the
rule of law.”21 The issue is not, however, whether the Justices are
committed to the institution; the issue is that the current system has
three deficiencies that are inconsistent with the role and stature of the
Supreme Court:
it lacks clear standards, transparency, and
accountability.22
I. STANDARDS
With respect to standards for recusal, the Justices follow 28 U.S.C.
§ 455, which requires recusal when a Justice’s impartiality may be
reasonably questioned. A code of conduct could help further elaborate
on those standards.23 What is missing from the Supreme Court,
however, is a body of precedent that further develops and interprets the
standards that Justices should apply when making recusal decisions. As
stated before, it is rare for a Justice to provide a written decision that
explains his or her reasoning regarding recusal. Indeed, as explained in
Lubet’s article, some Justices actually seem to feel that it would

17
Id. at 8; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657,
680–81 (2005) (discussing the Court’s 1993 recusal policy); Lubet, supra note 1, at 894–99.
18
ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 8; see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b) (2006) (providing the codification
for when any Justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall disqualify himself). Section 455(b)
also gives several specific circumstances warranting recusal, such as having personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding that would warrant
disqualification. Id.
19
Lubet, supra note 1, at 891–94.
20
ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 8–9.
21
Id. at 10.
22
See Alfini, supra note 4, at 10–11 (discussing the Supreme Court’s need for greater
transparency and accountability, particularly in the area of recusals).
23
For example, the Code of Conduct adopted by the Judicial Conference could provide
standards for the Supreme Court.
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somehow be inappropriate to share their reasoning with their
colleagues.24 The lack of written decisions, however, is inconsistent with
the role of the Supreme Court, which is in large part to provide
precedent that will promote uniformity in future decisions.
II. TRANSPARENCY
The current recusal procedures, and in particular the absence of
written decisions, also lack transparency. This deficiency prevents the
public from understanding why a Justice made a particular decision
regarding recusal, which is inconsistent with the great pride that the
institution usually exhibits in explaining to the public the reasons for its
decisions. This lack of transparency can harm the perceived integrity of
such an important institution and undermine the public’s trust that it is
operating in a non-partisan manner. While not discussing recusals, a
2009 speech by Justice Breyer addressing judicial independence supports
the idea that the Supreme Court needs to do a better job of addressing
the public’s perception that Justices are pursuing personal agendas. This
point applies with particular force to providing better information about
recusal decisions. Justice Breyer stated:
A poll was conducted at the beginning of the decade
that asked people whether they believed that judges
decide cases impartially and according to law or
whether they believe that judges do whatever they
desire as soon as they don a judicial robe. When that
poll was initially conducted, two-thirds of the
respondents believed that judges decided cases
impartially and one-third thought that judges simply
decided cases according to their own preferences. When
that same poll was conducted again five years later,
however, close to half of the respondents indicated that
judges’ votes are driven by their personal
predilections. . . .
All of my colleagues and I . . . fulfill our judicial
duties by attempting to decide cases in a manner that is
consistent with what the law requires.

24
Lubet, supra note 1, at 893. Lubet quotes journalist Tony Mauro who said that several
Justices told him “that they don’t explain their reasons because they would not want to
pressure their colleagues into recusing in a similar situation.” Id. (citing to Tony Mauro,
Justices in the Media, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2011, 11:11 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
community/justices-in-the-media/).
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But a serious discrepancy between our own view of
our own efforts and the view of a large segment of the
public is cause for concern in a democracy. . . . [T]he
judiciary is, in at least some measure, dependent on the
public’s fundamental acceptance of its legitimacy.25
Consistent with the sentiments in Justice Breyer’s speech, perhaps
the most important change that the Court could make regarding recusals
would be to require a written opinion from any Justice to whom a
motion for recusal is directed.26 This change would not necessarily
require the adoption of a code of conduct. It could simply be made part
of the Supreme Court’s rules or internal policies. Written decisions
would serve two key functions. First, they would develop a body of
precedent that would help develop standards, and thus uniformity,
among the Justices’ recusal decisions. Second, written decisions would
aid the public’s understanding of why a Justice chose to participate in a
case under circumstances in which a party to the litigation questioned
that Justice’s impartiality. The public may disagree with a Justice’s
decision, as many did with Justice Scalia’s decision not to recuse himself
in Cheney v. District Court, despite his duck hunting trip with the vice
president several weeks after the Supreme Court decided to hear the
case.27 Understanding a Justice’s reasons, however, at least allows for
public discourse about the matter, which is an important component of
democracy. The requirement for a written decision was contained in
H.R. 862 and urged by over 100 law professors who wrote to the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees.28 It is a requirement that the Supreme
Court should adopt.
Breyer, supra note 12.
Court rules could limit motions to parties to the litigation so that other interested
players, such as amici curie are not included. This would limit the number of motions that
would be filed, as parties to a suit pending before the Supreme Court are likely to be
judicious in filing such motions.
27
541 U.S. 913 (2004); see also Editorial, Recusals and the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/opinion/08fri1.html?_r=0 (stating that many
disagreed with Justice Scalia’s decision not to recuse himself).
28
H.R. 862, which was introduced in the House of Representatives on March 1, 2011,
stated in part:
If a justice of the Supreme Court denies a motion brought by a party to
a proceeding before the Court that the justice should be disqualified
from the proceeding under section 455 of such title, the justice shall
disclose in the public record of the proceeding the reasons for the
denial of the motion.
H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2011). The bill also required a Justice to disclose in the
public record reasons for disqualification when a Justice decides to recuse him or herself.
Id. § 3(a)(1).
25
26

http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss4/4

Rigertas: The Supreme Court and Recusals: A Response to Professor Lubet

2013]

The Supreme Court and Recusals

945

III. ACCOUNTABILITY
A key aspect of Lubet’s proposal would be to have the remaining
eight Justices review a Justice’s recusal decision.
Through this
mechanism, if an individual Justice did not have the objectivity to
accurately assess his or her impartiality, the remaining eight Justices
would be able to review and overrule that decision.29 This proposal
would provide a method of accountability in the cases, which may not be
common, when a Justice does not accurately assess his or her own
objectivity. It could also increase the integrity of the institution by
providing a means of review for these important decisions.30 It does,
however, raise some concerns about whether the public would construe
such a review process as a way for a group of Justices to exclude a Justice
for the purpose of pursuing a perceived partisan agenda. Lubet makes a
good point that individuals are not necessarily the best arbiters of their
own objectivity.31
As a further point, § 455 does not require that a Justice actually be
biased to warrant recusal. It states that a Justice “shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”32 The statute is somewhat vague in that it does not identify
who would reasonably question the Justice’s impartiality. In his annual
report, Roberts states that the “objective standard focuses the recusal
inquiry on the perspective of a reasonable person who is knowledgeable
about the legal process and familiar with the relevant facts.”33 The other
eight Justices are individuals who are knowledgeable about the legal
process and familiar with the relevant facts,34 so their review would aid

29
Another proposal by Stephen Gillers would be to send recusal motions to the Justice
involved and the Chief Justice. If the Justice decided not to recuse, the Chief Justice would
then act as a gatekeeper and decide if the motion warranted review by the full court.
Editorial, A Way Forward on Judicial Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/opinion/a-way-forward-on-judicial-ethics.html.
30
For example, Lubet describes how Justice Kagan set up her own screening process
while she was at the Justice Department to shield herself from information about the
government’s strategy in the health care litigation. Then, as a Justice, she was the sole
arbiter of whether her screening process was sufficient. Lubet, supra note 1, at 891–93.
Perhaps her assessment was correct, but the integrity of the process would benefit if her
assessment was subject to an outside review, even if the outcome was the same.
31
Lubet, supra note 1, at 897–98.
32
28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006); Bassett, supra note 17, at 674–76.
33
ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 7 (emphasis added).
34
It is also not clear what the “relevant facts” are. If they relate to the facts regarding the
Justice’s potential bias, in the absence of a written decision by the Justice who is
considering recusal, perhaps no one knows all of the potentially relevant facts other than
that Justice.
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assessing whether recusal is warranted in a particular case under the
standard in § 455.
Lubet addresses the concern about review of recusal decisions being
used as a tool for outcome manipulation.35 In his report, Chief Justice
Roberts stated that review by the full court “would create an undesirable
situation in which the Court could affect the outcome of a case by
selecting who among its Members may participate.”36 As Lubet
explains, if a majority of the Court—meaning five out of eight Justices—
is needed to overrule the ninth Justice’s decision to sit, then those five
Justices necessarily have a majority to control the outcome of the case
regardless of whether or not the ninth Justice sits.37 There is no danger
of outcome manipulation. Roberts’s reasoning is unpersuasive on that
point.
That being said, there is still a concern that a full court review could
create a public perception that the majority of Justices were acting in a
partisan way to manipulate outcomes. While Lubet’s explanation is
perfectly logical, this might be too subtle a point for much of the public
who may not be familiar enough with the workings of the Court to
understand this reasoning. Only one-third of Americans can name all
three branches of government.38 In one survey, only 37 percent of
Americans knew there were nine Justices on the Supreme Court.39 Only
one in seven Americans can name the Chief Justice.40 A 2005 survey
found that only 57 percent of Americans could name any Supreme Court
Justice.41 If much of the public does not have a basic understanding of
the Court, it may not understand that the majority does not need to
exclude a Justice in order to control the outcome of a case. Instead, they
may cynically view review by the whole Court as partisan outcome
Lubet, supra note 1, at 896–98.
ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 9.
37
Lubet, supra note 1, at 897.
38
Scott Warren, Iris Chen & Eric Schwarz, The Threat to American Democracy that Romney
and Obama Aren’t Talking About, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 16, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0716/The-threat-to-Americandemocracy-that-Romney-and-Obama-aren-t-talking-about. Former Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor has been advocating a return to stronger civics education in a webbased project. What Is iCivics?, ICIVICS, http://www.icivics.org/About (last visited Jan. 31,
2013).
39
Many Americans History, Civics-Challenged:
Poll, CBS NEWS (Mar. 22, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500202_162-20045778.html.
40
Francine Kiefer, Back to Basics by Getting Back to Civics Education, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (May 28, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-BoardBlog/2010/0528/Back-to-basics-by-getting-back-to-civics-education?nav=522450csm_article-bottomRelated.
41
Mark Hansen, Flunking Civics: Why America’s Kids Know so Little, A.B.A. J. (May 1,
2011), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/civics/.
35
36
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manipulation if, for example, there are five conservative Justices who
exclude a liberal Justice from sitting or vice versa. This could harm the
legitimacy of the institution. As Justice Breyer stated in his speech on
judicial independence:
[A] serious discrepancy between our own view of our
own efforts and the view of a large segment of the public
is cause for concern in a democracy. That is because the
judicial system, in a sense, floats on a sea of public
opinion. . . . [T]he judiciary is, in at least some measure,
dependent on the public’s fundamental acceptance of its
legitimacy. And when a large segment of the population
believes that judges are not deciding cases according to
the rule of law, much is at stake.42
H.R. 862 proposed a different approach whereby retired justices or
judges of other federal courts would review recusal decisions.43 Whether
Congress has the power to enact such a provision is questionable,44 but
by having outsiders conduct the review, this approach would address
concerns about an appearance of outcome manipulation by the Court.
Perhaps there is a hybrid approach that would address the outcome
manipulation perception problem but also keep the Court involved. For
example, if a Justice denied a motion to recuse, the Justice would provide
a written decision. If the party who made the motion was not satisfied
with the Justice’s reasoning, the party could ask the full court to assess
whether an outside review was warranted. If a majority of the Court
agreed that an outside review was warranted, then it would be referred
to a body of other judges and/or retired justices for a dispositive ruling.
If a majority of the Court did not find that an outside review was
warranted, then the Justice’s decision would stand.
In conclusion, Lubet’s article addresses many legitimate concerns
about the Supreme Court’s current recusal practice and its impact on the
integrity of the Court. If the Court enacted a code of conduct, that could
begin to address some of the concerns. The issue of enforcement,
however, would still need to be addressed. Lubet’s proposal for a full
Court review of recusal decisions could address that issue in the area of
Breyer, supra note 12.
H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 3(b) (2011).
44
Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1225–26 (2011); see also John Gibeaut, Sitting This One out: Health Care
Case Again Raises Recusal Controversy, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/sitting_this_one_out_health_care_case_ag
ain_raises_recusal_controversy/.
42
43
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recusals, but it does raise some concerns about how the public would
perceive the process. In my opinion, the most curative prescription
would be for the Court to require written decisions from Justices for
every recusal decision. This would help develop uniform standards for
recusal, which could have an indirect impact on accountability by
guiding future recusal decisions. It would also provide transparency so
the public would have a better understanding of why Justices chose to sit
in cases where there has been extensive public commentary on whether
or not they were impartial enough to do so.
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